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Abstract
Performance-critical machine learning mod-
els should be robust to input perturbations
not seen during training. Adversarial train-
ing is a method for improving a model’s ro-
bustness to some perturbations by including
them in the training process, but this tends to
exacerbate other vulnerabilities of the model.
The adversarial training framework has the ef-
fect of translating the data with respect to the
cost function, while weight decay has a scal-
ing effect. Although weight decay could be
considered a crude regularization technique,
it appears superior to adversarial training as
it remains stable over a broader range of
regimes and reduces all generalization errors.
Equipped with these abstractions, we provide
key baseline results and methodology for char-
acterizing robustness. The two approaches can
be combined to yield one small model that
demonstrates good robustness to several white-
box attacks associated with different metrics.1
1 Introduction
Machine learning models have been shown to work well
in a variety of domains, for the equivalent of labora-
tory conditions in the physical sciences. As engineers
increasingly opt to deploy these models in performance-
critical applications such as autonomous driving or in
medical devices, it is necessary to characterize how they
behave in the field. In the aforementioned applications,
the confidence with which a prediction was made can
be even more important than the prediction itself. Un-
fortunately, deep neural networks (DNNs) leave much
1Source code and pre-trained models available https:
//github.com/uoguelph-mlrg/adversarial_
training_vs_weight_decay
to be desired, typically offering little interpretability to
their predictions, unreliable confidence estimates, and
tending to fail in unexpected ways (Biggio et al., 2013;
Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Nguyen
et al., 2015). The adversarial examples phenomenon af-
flicting machine learning models has shed light on the
need for higher levels of abstraction to confer reliable
performance in a variety of environments, where mod-
els may be pushed to the limit intentionally by adver-
saries, or unintentionally with out-of-distribution data.
Although such settings could be seen as violating the i.i.d
assumption implicit in typical machine learning experi-
ments, raising this objection provides little comfort when
systems fail unexpectedly.
In this work, we compare the approach of augment-
ing training data with worst-case examples (Szegedy
et al., 2014), which can result in somewhat mysteri-
ous effects (Kurakin et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018),
to weight decay, which is more mathematically under-
stood (Neyshabur et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016).
There remains a widely held belief that adversarial exam-
ples are linked to the linear behaviour of machine learn-
ing models (Goodfellow et al., 2015). We begin by de-
veloping stronger intuition for linear models, finding that
adversarial training can be seen as translating the data
w.r.t. the loss, while weight decay scales the loss. With
these abstractions, we report a 40% improvement in ab-
solute accuracy over a previous baseline, while incurring
a modest 2.4% loss for the natural data.
We leverage the translation and scaling perspective to
tune a low-capacity model to be more robust for medium
to large perturbations bounded in the Hamming dis-
tance (or L0 counting “norm”) for the CIFAR-10
dataset (Krizhevsky, 2009) than another compelling de-
fense against white-box attacks (Madry et al., 2018).
The same model is competitive for L∞ bounded at-
tacks, and outputs high-entropy distributions over its
softmax-probabilities for out-of-distribution examples,
such as fooling images (Nguyen et al., 2015). The model
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seems more interpretable, and has two orders of magni-
tude fewer parameters than the current baseline.
2 Related Work
After two investigations of defenses against adversar-
ial examples (Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018),
the only approach that maintained a significant robust-
ness improvement was based on adversarial training.
Many previous works attempt to slow down attackers
by manipulating or masking gradients at test time, but
these do nothing to improve generalization. We refer
the interested reader to Carlini and Wagner (2017b) and
Athalye et al. (2018) for concise summaries of com-
mon mistakes. The iterative projected gradient descent
(PGD) method with a random start, proposed by Madry
et al., currently holds a benchmark for robustness to per-
turbations w.r.t. the CIFAR-10 test set, for a threat model
in which an adversary may perturb any number of pix-
els by ±8 from their original integer values ∈ [0, 255].
However, there is growing concern that this L∞ norm
threat model is unrealistically weak (Sharma and Chen,
2017; Trame`r et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018; Galloway
et al., 2018).
By slightly extending the threat model of Madry et al.,
the PGD defense has been found to perform worse than
an equivalent undefended model for MNIST (LeCun and
Cortes, 1998), which is considered one of the easier
datasets to defend on due to its low dimensionality and
high separability. Weaknesses of the PGD defense for
MNIST include adding a constant to all pixels (Galloway
et al., 2018), rotating images by 20◦ prior to attack, or
randomly flipping just five pixels (Trame`r et al., 2018).
An elastic-net black-box transfer attack (Sharma and
Chen, 2017) achieved higher success rates than the at-
tacks considered by Madry et al., but with less distortion
in the same L∞ norm. For CIFAR-10, the official Madry
et al. defense fails the fooling images test (Nguyen et al.,
2015) by classifying with maximum confidence unrecog-
nizable images initialized from uniform noise (Galloway
et al., 2018).
A formal certificate of robustness based on adversarial
training was recently provided by Sinha et al. (2018),
and while their principled approach is laudable, the threat
model considered is weaker than that of Madry et al.
(2018) and exclusively deals with imperceptibly small
perturbations, which were not well defined. The trans-
lation view of adversarial training proposed in this work
offers insight into the difficulty of using the framework
with large perturbations, and suggests that it may indeed
be inherently limited to the small perturbation regime.
In support of the threat model chosen by Madry et al.,
there are still few standards for assessing robustness, and
the L∞ metric facilitates convenient high-level compar-
isons based on a single data-point. To the best of our
knowledge, the original use of L∞ for bounding adver-
sarial examples arose from a desire to mitigate pertur-
bations akin to steganography2. Under L∞, the cumula-
tive effect of changes to each input dimension (i.e. pixel)
smaller than the least resolvable feature in the digital rep-
resentation of the training data (e.g. with 8-bits), is to be
“decoded” such that any desired class is predicted with
high-confidence (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
There are many types of perturbations models could be
subject to, therefore we intentionally depart from the tra-
ditional security literature to explore trade-offs implicit
in choosing a specific threat model. We sweep pertur-
bation magnitude through the full dynamic range, or un-
til accuracy is reduced to less than chance, for attacks
that are optimized for different Lp metrics3 (e.g. p ∈
0, 1, 2,∞). For security, performance is no better than
the worst of any particular case, but depending on the
application, practitioners may wish to choose the model
that maximizes area under all curves. Attacking until
models reach zero accuracy was proposed by Athalye
et al. (2018) to rule out gradient masking as contributing
to a false positive defense. We find that additional insight
can be gained even between chance and zero, therefore
we usually opt for the latter.
It was recently shown that regularizing shallow con-
volutional neural networks with strong L2 weight de-
cay does mitigate the fooling images attack, also known
as “rubbish” examples, for the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets (Galloway et al., 2018). ForL∞ bounded pertur-
bations of natural CIFAR-10 data, these models perform
more closely to the PGD-trained WideResNet bench-
mark (Madry et al., 2018) than the other defenses tested
by Athalye et al. (2018), despite having only 1% as many
parameters.
Previous works briefly tested or acknowledged the role
of weight decay as a possible defense against adver-
sarial perturbations, but it is generally discarded along
with other “regularization techniques” as adversarial ex-
amples are not typically viewed as an overfitting prob-
lem (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). Fol-
low on works generally refer to this preliminary conclu-
sion, and do not consider weight decay given a constraint
of not “seriously harming” classification accuracy on be-
nign inputs (Papernot et al., 2016a) 4.
2The encoding of secrets in plain sight, e.g., in an image.
3For p = 0, we mean Hamming distance.
4In a personal communication with the first author, they
clarified that adversarial examples are partly due to overfit-
ting, but that this is not the only explanation for their existence,
2
We maintain that most adversarial examples observed in
practice are of the “Type 2”—overfitting—variety in the
taxonomy of Tanay and Griffin (2016), and that “serious
harm” is too arbitrary for a constraint, and should prob-
ably be a criteria. Other works used a small weight de-
cay penalty concurrently with other regularization tech-
niques (e.g. dropout) that exhibit different behaviour, and
where the contribution of the norm penalty is insignifi-
cant, or where it is only applied to the last layer of a deep
network (Cisse et al., 2017).
Rozsa et al. (2016) argue that correctly classified exam-
ples have a small contribution in the cross-entropy loss,
leading to “evolutionary stalling” that prevents the de-
cision boundary from flattening near the training data.
However, if we consider the high-dimensional geome-
try of finite volume sub-manifolds corresponding to each
class in a fixed dataset, flatter shapes actually minimize
the smallest adversarial distance, while a manifold with
constant positive curvature (e.g. a sphere) maximizes dis-
tance in all directions. Rozsa et al. found that batch ad-
justing network gradients (BANG) increases overfitting
on natural data, which they also address with dropout,
further complicating the experiments. Both Rozsa et al.
and Cisse et al. evaluate on weak single-step attacks that
linearly approximate the loss of their deep models. Suc-
cess against linear attacks can be improved by making
models less linear, but non-linear models do not neces-
sarily generalize better. Non-linearity is defeated with
iterative attacks which can still yield examples that trans-
fer, thus enabling black-box attacks (Trame`r et al., 2018).
Trame`r et al. found that adversarial training on ImageNet
often converges to a degenerate global minimum, leading
to a kind of learned gradient masking effect. Rather than
becoming robust, it’s conceivable that models may in-
tentionally contort their decision boundaries s.t. weaker
adversarial examples are crafted that are easy to clas-
sify. Trame`r et al. attempt to prevent this by transfer-
ring examples from an ensemble of pre-trained models,
hence decoupling adversarial example generation from
the model being learned. They claim improved robust-
ness to some black-box transfer attacks, but at the ex-
pense of white-box performance. The ensemble method
was omitted from the analyses of Athalye et al. (2018), as
white-box robustness is strictly more difficult than in the
black-box setting. The technique was shown to not hold
in a more general black-box threat model using a query-
efficient gradient estimator (Ilyas et al., 2017; Ilyas,
2018), and a gradient-free genetic algorithm (Alzantot
et al., 2018).
therefore traditional regularization methods are not sufficient
to mitigate adversarial examples. They did not intend to im-
ply that robustness should come at no cost of accuracy for the
natural data.
Our translation perspective can explain why decoupling
adversarial example generation is insufficient: degener-
ate global minima are an inherent result arising from
training on worst-case perturbations with fixed magni-
tude, which fails to account for changing distances be-
tween individual training data and the decision bound-
ary as a model learns. To perform adversarial training
in a way that is mathematically correct requires taking
into account the distance of each example from the class
mean.
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in developing
knowledge in norm-based capacity control of linear and
depth-limited networks (Bengio et al., 2006; Neyshabur
et al., 2015) as an explanation for generalization in deep
learning (Neyshabur et al., 2017; Tsuzuku et al., 2018).
On the other hand, there remains an operating hypothe-
sis in many recent works that the existence of adversarial
examples is linked to the linear behaviour of machine
learning models (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Norm-based
capacity control is well-characterized for linear models,
letting us explicitly deal with adversarial examples as a
subset of the generalization problem in this setting. Lin-
ear models are thought to be highly interpretable, or at
least more so than their deep non-linear counterparts,
therefore it can seem unintuitive that they may experi-
ence adversarial examples. However, we caution against
using this premise to refute attempts at making models
more interpretable in general, as linear models do not al-
ways suffer from adversarial examples.
Previous work has identified limitations with the lin-
ear interpretation for the existence of adversarial ex-
amples, through manipulating hidden representations in
DNNs with feature adversaries (Sabour et al., 2015), the
boundary tilting perspective (Tanay and Griffin, 2016),
and an insightful commentary on high-dimensional ge-
ometry (Dube, 2018). Most similar to this work is that
of Tanay and Griffin, however they did not empirically
validate their perspective with DNNs, nor discuss adver-
sarial training. To limit further confusion around linear-
ity, we begin by characterizing linear models for binary
classification, then evaluate DNNs on CIFAR-10.
3 Robust Logistic Regression
To support our rejection of the “linearity hypothesis”, we
re-visit Section 5 from Goodfellow et al. (2015) in which
it is motivated by observing that a linear classifier, logis-
tic regression, is vulnerable to adversarial examples for
MNIST “3” versus “7” binary classification. They in-
troduce a single-step attack known as the fast gradient
method (FGM), of which the sign variant (FGSM) is the
strongest possible attack against a linear model when an
adversary is constrained in the L∞ norm. Perturbations
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are scaled by a constant  when using the L∞ norm,
where  can always be interpreted as a fraction of the
input range which has been normalized between [0, 1]
when it appears in decimal form. In this setting, Good-
fellow et al. reported a 99% test error rate for an FGSM
perturbation scaled by  = 0.25, which we denote “the
baseline” in Sections 3 and 4. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no updated result has since been reported for this
experiment. Goodfellow et al. later compared the regular-
izing effects of adversarial training on FGSM examples
to L1 weight decay, which we re-visit in Section 4.
For the experiments in this section, we use a parameter
initialization scheme that consists of subtracting the aver-
age MNIST “7” from the average “3”, which we refer to
as “expert initialization”. By simply using this initializa-
tion, we obtain a 39% absolute percentage improvement
over the baseline, but the model underfits with ≈ 5.2%
error on the clean test set. These are approximately the
resulting set of weights after empirical risk minimization
(ERM) fully converges when training from scratch with
L2 weight decay, if one accounts for minor differences
due to stochastic optimization with a particular batch
size, learning rate, etc. In addition to conferring good
robustness, we use this expert scheme to facilitate repro-
ducibility. We depict weights, and perturbations crafted
by FGSM in Figure 1. Goodfellow et al. comment on
Figure 1(c) in their original caption that the perturbation
is not readily recognizable even though the model is fit
well.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: Visualization of (a) logistic regression model
weights after expert initialization, and fine-tuning for
10k steps on the sigmoid cross entropy loss with
Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014), a batch size of 128, learn-
ing rate of 1e-5, and an overallL2 regularization constant
of 0.05. (b) A binarized set of weights after training with
the same procedure from scratch for 50k steps. Plots (c)
and (d) are taken from Goodfellow et al. (2015) for com-
parison purposes, (c) is an FGSM perturbation for true
class label “7”, and (d) the actual weights. The faint
dark pixels in (d) resemble a slightly rotated “?” sym-
bol, wheras “3” and “7” are visible in (a).
We argue that there is a clear interpretation of such a
perturbation. In this particular case, one’s intuition is
partly obscured due to having used the sign of the gra-
dient (FGSM) rather than the real gradient. Although the
L∞ bounded FGSM is the strongest attack against the lo-
gistic regression model, it is not the most efficient attack.
The gradient sign in Figure 1(c) is recognizable as bi-
narizing the continuous valued weights, and the roughly
3–5 pixel wide noisy border reflects directions where the
weights are close to, but not exactly zero5. We can in-
duce a nearly identical error rate, but with less distortion
by using the actual gradient, and normalizing it to have
unit L2 norm, the “Fast grad L2” method from Kurakin
et al. (2017) (their Appendix A).
The perturbation image shown in Figure 1(c) for the
FGSM attack is approximately identical to the binary
weights of a binarized model trained on this task from
scratch, as shown in Figure 1(b). We know the binarized
model is not an optimal model here, as we would like
it to be totally invariant to the areas around the border
where the real-valued model’s weights, and the differ-
ence between the average “7” and “3”, are almost zero.
The binarized model tries to be as invariant as possible to
the background by roughly equally distributing the po-
larity of weights in these areas. Cropping the dataset
more closely around the digits, or allowing a third pa-
rameter state (e.g. by using a ternary network, or pruning
connections to bordering pixels) would make the model
more robust. In terms of the boundary tilting perspec-
tive, such a model minimizes tilting along dimensions of
low-variance in the data (Tanay and Griffin, 2016).
Using the expert initialization scheme and training
procedure from Figure 1(a), our “Expert-L2” model
achieves 59% test error for an FGSM attack, compared
to the 99% baseline error rate, for the same perturbation
size  = 0.25 w.r.t. the L∞ norm. This 40% improve-
ment is consistently reproducible, but the model incurs a
4% error rate on the natural test set, compared to 1.6%
error for the baseline model. We believe the 2.4% loss in
“clean” test accuracy in exchange for a 40% gain for this
attack is a good trade-off. After a brief search, we find
that a randomly initialized model can handle very large
norm penalties. For example, training from scratch for
50k steps with λ = 3.25 maintains the ≈ 4% test error
of the Expert-L2 model, while achieving 43% and 64%
FGSM error rates for L1 and L2 weight decay respec-
tively. Next we explain why we prefer penalizing the L2
norm of the weights rather than the L1 norm, despite the
slightly higher FGSM error rate for the former.
It may seem that a 59% FGSM error for  = 0.25 is
still unreasonably high, but we argue that this data point
is fairly uninformative in isolation and does not imply
robustness, or a lack thereof. With exceedingly high L1
weight decay (e.g. with λ = 32), we can further reduce
5Implementations of the sign method, e.g. in numpy and
TensorFlow do pass through 0 as 0.
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the FGSM error rate to 25%, but what do we suspect the
robustness behaviour of this model will be?
Even for the linear case where the FGM is exact, one
score does not tell the full story. Although these types of
comparisons are convenient for researchers, they are po-
tentially harmful in the long run as this rewards overfit-
ting a particular threat model, which we have already ob-
served. We leave it up to researchers to rigorously attack
their proposed defenses, and suggest that characterizing
the slope of the accuracy roll-off curve for a variety of
optimization-based or engineered attacks makes a more
compelling defense. As a further assessment, the nature
of the distortion introduced by the attack may be of inter-
est when expressed quantitatively and qualitatively. The
59% error rate for Expert-L2 coincides with a mean L2
distortion of ≈ 4% over the full test set. As this dis-
tortion metric is not always representative of perceptual
distance (e.g. it is not translation invariant), we include
candidate adversarial images for Expert-L2 in Figure 2.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Figure 2: (a) Fast grad L2 perturbation for original
class “3”, and candidate adversarial examples for orig-
inal class “3” [(b)–(d)] and “7” [(e)–(g)]. All images
remain correctly classified when perturbation bounded
by  = 0.25 in the L∞ norm, we therefore call them
only candidate examples as in Kurakin et al. (2017). The
average “3” is clearly visible in images originally depict-
ing a “7”, and vice versa.
To show that an attack causing less distortion than FGSM
can still be interpretable, we adapt the Fast grad L2
method by scaling the normalized gradient by 100× be-
fore clipping to ±. Scaling by 100 lets us approximate
the higher error rate caused by FGSM, while minimizing
unnecessary distortion. This attack results in an error rate
of 58.9%, compared to 59.1% on our Expert-L2 model
when vanilla FGSM is used, but causes 4.00%–L2 dis-
tortion compared to 4.57% for FGSM. Clearly the im-
ages in Figure 2 are ambiguous even for human vision,
and correct classification could be contingent on having
previously seen a sampling of natural examples. These
examples support the observation of Tanay and Griffin
(2016) that:
. . . the weight vector found by logistic re-
gression points in a direction that is close to
passing through the mean images of the two
classes, thus defining a decision boundary sim-
ilar to the one of a nearest centroid classifier.
4 Adversarial Training Versus Weight
Decay for Linear Models
In linear classification, weight decay is often explained
as a way of enforcing a preference for models with
small weights (e.g. section 5.2.2 of (Goodfellow et al.,
2016)). Yet there is no reason, a priori, for models with
small weights to generalize better: all the weight vectors
λw with λ > 0 define the same hyperplane boundary,
whether λ is small or large. The norm of the weight vec-
tor is only meaningful in the context of ERM, because
it influences the scaling of the loss function (Neyshabur
et al., 2017; Tsuzuku et al., 2018).
We first introduce this natural interpretation of weight
decay as affecting the scaling of the loss function, and
then directly compare variants of adversarial training to
L1 and L2 weight decay.
4.1 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a logistic regression model with input x ∈ Rd,
labels y ∈ {±1}, parameterized by weights w, bias b,
and having sigmoid non-linearity σ(z). Predictions are
defined by σ(w>x+ b) and the model can be optimized
by stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the sigmoid
cross entropy loss. This reduces to SGD on (1) where
ζ is the softplus loss6 ζ(z) = log(1 + e−z):
Ex,y∼pdata ζ(y(w>x+ b)) (1)
In Figure 3, we develop intuition for the different quanti-
ties contained in (1) with respect to a typical binary clas-
sification problem. We will later see how this analysis
generalizes to the multi-class setting.
We note that w>x + b is a scaled, signed distance
between x and the classification boundary defined by
our model. If we define d(x) as the signed Euclidean
distance between x and the boundary, then we have:
w>x+ b = ‖w‖2 d(x). Hence, minimizing (1) is equiv-
alent to minimizing:
Ex,y∼pdata ζ(‖w‖2 × y d(x)) (2)
We define the scaled softplus loss as:
ζ‖w‖2(z) := ζ(‖w‖2 × z) (3)
And we see that adding a L2 weight decay term in (2),
resulting in (4), can be understood as a way of controlling
the scaling of the softplus function:
Ex,y∼pdata ζ‖w‖2(y d(x)) + λ‖w‖2 (4)
6Our function ζ is the mirror of the one used in Goodfellow
et al. (2015): ζ(z) ← ζ(−z). This definition removes the
superfluous negative sign inside ζ later on.
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(a) w>x+ b (b) y(w>x+ b) (c) ζ(y(w>x+ b))
Figure 3: (a) For a given weight vector w and bias b, the
values of w>x+ b over the training set typically follow
a bimodal distribution (corresponding to the two classes)
centered on the classification boundary. (b) Multiplying
by the label y allows us to distinguish the correctly clas-
sified data in the positive region from misclassified data
in the negative region. (c) We can then attribute a penalty
to each training point by applying the softplus loss to
y(w>x+ b).
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of varying λ, the regular-
ization parameter for ‖w‖2.
(a) ζ5(y d(x)) (b) ζ0.5(y d(x)) (c) ζ0.05(y d(x))
Figure 4: (a) For a small regularization parameter (large
‖w‖2), the misclassified data is penalized linearly while
the correctly classified data is not penalized. (b) A
medium regularization parameter (medium ‖w‖2) corre-
sponds to smoothly blending the margin. (c) For a large
regularization parameter (small ‖w‖2), the entire data is
penalized almost linearly.
Similarly, we can interpret adversarial training as acting
on the horizontal offset of y d(x). Training on worst case
adversarial examples consists of replacing x with x′ =
x−  y wˆ (where wˆ = w/‖w‖2). We then have:
y (w>x′ + b) = y (w>(x−  y wˆ) + b)
= y (w>x+ b)−  ‖w‖2
= ‖w‖2 × (y d(x)− )
Substituting the above expression into the scaled softplus
function (3) yields:
Ex,y∼pdata ζ‖w‖2(y d(x)− ) (5)
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of varying the adversarial
perturbation magnitude, or offset parameter .
The softplus function has a linear region penalizing the
misclassified data, a saturated region leaving the cor-
rectly classified data unaffected, and a smooth transi-
(a) ζ1(y d(x)) (b) ζ1(y d(x)− 3) (c) ζ1(y d(x)− 13)
Figure 5: (a) No adversarial training. (b) Moderate ad-
versarial training effectively enforces a larger margin by
translating the data into the misclassified region, while
softplus scaling remains unaffected. (c) With strong ad-
versarial training, all the data is in the misclassified re-
gion. This regime is unstable and we expect models with
limited statistical complexity to fail to converge, which
we observe experimentally.
tion between these two regions enforcing a safety mar-
gin. Both weight decay and adversarial training can be
interpreted as influencing how these different regions in-
teract with the data. Weight decay strikes an effective
balance between the two extreme regimes: when it is
very low, the margin blend is very sharp, as seen in Fig-
ure 4(a). When it is very high, nearly all of the data falls
into the margin, shown in Figure 4(c), resulting in un-
derfitting, but no risk of instability as the data does not
shift. Adversarial training artificially increases the size
of the margin by translating some or all of the data into
the misclassified region, as in Figure 5(b). It becomes un-
stable when the offset used is too strong, which we depict
in Figure 5(c) and verify experimentally in Section 4.2.
Overall, weight decay seems more theoretically sound
given that it allows a broader variety of behaviors and
remains stable for all regimes, whereas the adversarial
training framework is inherently limited to small pertur-
bations. This translation and scaling perspective explains
why adversarial training and weight decay can comple-
ment each other when small perturbations are used, but
ultimately, weight decay is the more sound instrument.
In this section we focused on the L2 norm case which
is, in our opinion, more intuitive since d(x) can then be
interpreted as the Euclidean distance from the boundary.
However, L1 weight decay and FGSM adversarial train-
ing can be shown to implement similar transformations
in a different normed space, thus enforcing robustness to
different types of perturbations. We perform experiments
using both norms in the following section.
4.2 Experiments
Consider the same logistic regression model as in pre-
vious sections. We use the standard form of the soft-
plus loss7 where ζ(z) = log(1 + ez) to facilitate a direct
7with positive z this time.
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comparison with (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Training the
model consists in minimizing the loss (6) with SGD:
Ex,y∼pdataζ(−y(w>x+ b)). (6)
The gradient of (6) with respect to the input x is −yw,
and its sign is −y sign(w). Note that the label y was
omitted in the original Goodfellow et al. paper, result-
ing in an asymmetric penalty for adversarial training.
Training on worst case L∞ bounded examples for lo-
gistic regression consists of replacing x in (6) with
x − y sign(w), resulting in (7). The perturbation term
yw> sign(w) is equivalent to an y‖w‖1 penalty on the
weights.
Ex,y∼pdataζ(−(y(w>x+ b)− ‖w‖1)) (7)
Compare the expression (7) to instead adding the L1
penalty controlled by regularization factor λ, outside of
ζ(z) as in (8):
Ex,y∼pdataζ(−y(w>x+ b)) + λ‖w‖1. (8)
We now provide a learning theoretic observation of the
differences between the two expressions, which comple-
ments the scaling and translation view. The parameter
norm penalty in (7) is trapped in ζ(z), and interacts with
y (the true or predicted label), but this is not the case
with weight decay (8). This leads to a possible perverse
instantiation of the ERM minimization objective in (7) if
‖w‖1 overpowers −(w>x + b), as the model may in-
tentionally learn to make wrong predictions in order to
“escape” the saturating region of ζ and maximize weight
updates for shrinking ‖w‖1. Although (8) also causes
the model to trade-off accuracy on the training data in
order to keep λ‖w‖1 small, there is no risk of acciden-
tally teaching a preference for false predictions on the
natural data for very large λ.
Goodfellow et al. suggested that a possible benefit of
adversarial training is that the L1 penalty is subtracted
from the activation, rather than added to the training
cost, therefore the penalty could disappear if the model
makes predictions confident enough to saturate ζ. How-
ever, this is only true for confident correct predictions,
which are only possible for small . Otherwise ζ is op-
erated in the non-saturating linear region. More impor-
tantly, the translation effect artificially increases the mar-
gin between classes at the risk of overfitting, whereas
weight decay encourages underfitting. They did not re-
port any experiments where weight decay was applied to
the logistic regression model currently under considera-
tion, and only allude to a brief experiment where small
(e.g. λ = 0.0025) L1 penalties were used on the first
layer of a maxout network (Goodfellow et al., 2013) with
an unreported architecture and depth. It is also unclear if
this was done independently, or concurrently, with adver-
sarial training, and for how many steps or epochs. Ulti-
mately, only one data-point for one trial was provided, a
5% error on the training set.
In accordance with the theoretical discussion of equa-
tions (7) and (8), we observe a positive feedback loop
when using FGSM training, and find that it does not de-
activate automatically, as suggested it may when it was
originally proposed. Although weight decay also does
not deactivate automatically per se, we argue that this is
not a limitation provided that one carefully tunes λ to
obtain a suitable scaling of the loss with respect to the
number of examples and variance in the data.
Adversarial training with medium  (e.g. 0.25) proceeds
as follows: initially a randomly initialized model poorly
fits the training data and ζ is in the linear region, staying
there for much of the overall training time. In the linear
region of ζ, it is as if the L1 penalty is added to the cost,
as in (8).
Ex,y∼pdataζ(−y(w>x+ b)) + ‖w‖1
Predictions of either class are systematically reduced by
‖w‖1, which leads to the bimodal distribution shown
in Figure 3(a) shifting inward. Activations, and therefore
‖w‖1, decrease monotonically, while the training loss in-
creases monotonically since predictions are made with
less confidence. When we finally enter the non-linear
region of ζ, the training loss is high, but there are few
non-zero parameters left to update, resulting in aggres-
sive changes to just a few weights. Beyond a certain
point, not even strong weight decay can rescue learning if
we consider training on the bi-stable examples generated
with a constant  in Figure 2. In the case of a near per-
fect decision boundary, approximately that defined by the
weights visualized in Figure 1(a), and  larger than the
distance from an example to the boundary, we get exam-
ples that literally belong to the opposite class. Adversar-
ial training becomes even more destructive, the closer a
model is toward converging near a suitable solution.
We acknowledge that in most practical applications of in-
terest we don’t have a perfect boundary, but this simple
case clearly contradicts the notion that the penalty disap-
pears on its own, at least in the way that we would like
it to. There is no reason to expect the situation will im-
prove for higher-dimensional higher-variance problems
like CIFAR-10 or ImageNet.
Figure 6 shows the effect of adversarial training on our
logistic regression model. FGSM adversarial training al-
ways converges to the solution in Figure 6(b) given a suf-
ficient number of steps, regardless of whether the true
label or the model’s own prediction is used to construct
the adversarial examples, independent of expert initial-
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 6: Weight visualization for (a)  = 0.25 FGSM
training for 10k steps, and (b) 50k steps. (c) Training
instead for 50k steps only with L1 weight decay and
λ = 15. Training with the same  for Fast grad L2 results
in similar weights (not shown) as in (a) and (b), but a
more interpretable perturbation image after 10k (d), and
50k steps (e). Increasing  to 0.5 results in non-stability
and fails to train as the model lacks sufficient capacity
to overfit the residual noise arising from overlapping the
class centroids (f).
ization or otherwise, and of weight decay being used or
not. In other words, FGSM adversarial training with
 = 0.25 always overpowers our initialization scheme
and the L2 weight decay with λ = 0.05, converging on
this solution that obtains seemingly good accuracy for
two benchmarks, around 96% for the clean test set and
71% for FGSM with  = 0.25. However, it should be
apparent on inspection of the weights that this model is
not a good fit for this data. Notice in Figure 6(d) that
training with Fast grad L2 and medium  results in a low-
frequency perturbation image like the weights of Expert-
L2, but contains high-frequency artifacts due to the sharp
transition between the linear and saturating region of the
softplus loss in this regime due to the apparent transla-
tion of the data. When  further increases in Figure 6(f),
there is nothing left to fit but noise.
These degenerate solutions that obtain high FGM accu-
racy fail the fooling images test as they cannot gener-
ate natural looking data examples when gradient ascent
is performed on the logit(s), despite making such pre-
dictions with high-confidence (Nguyen et al., 2015; Gal-
loway et al., 2018). Additionally, an L0 adversary can
quickly cause a model tuned for the L∞ metric to pre-
dict at no better than chance by setting a small number
of pixels corresponding to the locations of the min and
max weights in Figures 6(b) and 6(c) to 1. The effect of
this black-box L0 attack is depicted in Figure 7(a), and
shows how adversarial training can behave like the clas-
sic “whack-a-mole” game. Even though we used expert
knowledge to craft this attack, it is unreasonable to as-
sume that attackers would not be able uncover similar
information given enough time. The attack also simu-
lates the effect of “dead pixels” which could arise in a
robotic system or sensor deployed in the wild.
Although the linear model has limited capacity, it is sur-
prisingly robust to an FGSM attack when trained with
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Figure 7: A comparison between (a) anL0 attack, and (b)
L∞–FGSM. Models trained with FGSM were more ro-
bust in (b), but less so in (a). An undefended model
(“Natural”) was robust in (a), but not (b). Expert-L2 was
reasonably robust to both. The model trained on FGSM
examples used  = 0.25, and the x-intercept at≈ 20 pix-
els in (a) is translated left and right by training with dif-
ferent . Annotated is Expert-L2 accuracy corresponding
to the  = 0.25–FGSM error rate discussed in Section 3.
FGSM, as shown in Figure 7(b). This is at odds with the
recommendation of Madry et al., whom suggest increas-
ing capacity to train with a strong adversary. We argue
that this becomes an arms race to use as much capacity as
possible, and strongly advise against this as it encourages
poor generalization outside the considered threat model.
In this case, for the L∞ metric FGSM is the strongest
possible adversary, and the model appears robust until
we consider our trivial L0 attack. Note that there was
an insignificant difference between using the true label
or the model’s own prediction when generating the train-
ing examples, since predictions closely matched the true
labels. To summarize the results of Figure 7: models
trained with FGSM were robust to FGSM, but not to an
L0 attack. Undefended models were robust to the L0
attack, but not FGSM. Models trained with L2 weight
decay were reasonably robust to both, and their perfor-
mance declined slowly and predictably for unbounded
perturbations.
4.3 Discussion
When a randomly initialized model is trained without
weight decay, spurious data are fit more tightly, leav-
ing the boundary near the data sub-manifolds. Adver-
sarial training examples generated with such a boundary
are projected by only a small distance, having a small
but increasingly positive effect. Given that the effect is
small initially, there is a natural inclination to use a large
. Medium to high  adversarial training seems to work
well in practice for high-capacity deep neural networks
because they are able to fit the signal and the noise, an
effect we aren’t the first to observe (Zhang et al., 2017).
To use adversarial training in a more principled manner
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implies that  should at the very least be decayed when
training, just as is commonly done with learning rates.
Ultimately, the value of  used with adversarial training
is a poorly characterized constant that has been selected
with limited intuition in much of the literature to date.
To be mathematically correct,  should be a function of
each example’s distance from its class mean. Yet another
hyper-parameter is introduced, as we must set both an
 decay schedule, as well as a unique  per each image.
This brings us back to weight decay, which typically only
has one hyper-parameter, the regularization constant λ,
and whose behaviour is reasonably well characterized at
several levels of abstraction. We say reasonably well be-
cause its exact behaviour remains somewhat of a mys-
tery in deep learning (Zhang et al., 2017), and if it was
fully characterized then it would have been used in the
baseline work to defend their logistic regression model
against imperceptible adversarial examples.
There is ample room to further understand how norm
constraints compare to other types of explicit and im-
plicit regularizers used in deep learning, and how to
bound generalization error in this setting (Neyshabur
et al., 2017). As we will see in Section 6, it can be
surprising that L2 weight decay has a filter-level prun-
ing effect when used with CNNs, rather than simply
making all elements small. What remains in the first
layer are smooth filters that implement fundamental im-
age processing primitives, somewhat similar to the fully-
connected weights of our Expert-L2 model.
5 Deep Neural Networks
It was suggested in the seminal work of Szegedy et al.
(2014) that the existence of adversarial examples in neu-
ral networks is related to the notion of Lipschitz con-
stant, which measures the least-upper-bound of the ratio
between output distances and corresponding input dis-
tances. This idea was further developed and formulated
explicitly by Cisse et al. (2017), who suggested that a
neural network’s sensitivity to adversarial perturbations
can be controlled by the Lipschitz constant. Yet this ar-
gument is incomplete: just like rescaling the weight vec-
tor of a linear classifier does not affect the hyperplane
boundary it defines, varying the Lipschitz constant of a
neural network by rescaling its output affects neither its
predictions nor its vulnerability to adversarial perturba-
tions (Tsuzuku et al., 2018). Instead, we argue that the
Lispchitz constant is only meaningful in the context of
ERM because it influences the way the loss function dis-
tributes penalties over the training data (Neyshabur et al.,
2017; Tsuzuku et al., 2018). Below, we generalize our
considerations of Section 4.1 on binary linear classifica-
tion to multiclass neural networks and we then reinterpret
weight decay and adversarial training as part of a broader
family of output regularizers.
5.1 Generalizing the Binary Linear Case
Consider a feedforward networkN consisting of l layers
with parameters W1, . . . ,Wl and Rectified Linear Unit
activations φ. We assume thatN does not use any weight
or batch normalization and for simplicity, we also neglect
the role of the biases. For an input image x, the logit
layer of N can be written:
z(x) =Wl φ(Wl−1 φ(. . . φ(W1 x))) .
For a scalar λ we have φ(λx) = λφ(x) and therefore,
decaying all the weights Wi ← λWi is equivalent to
decaying the logits:
z(x)← λl z(x).
In binary classification, z is a scalar and λl acts as a
scaling parameter for the softplus function. In multi-
class classification, z is a vector and λl acts as a tem-
perature parameter for the softmax function. We see that
increasing weight decay produces smoother probability
distributions, and therefore increases the contribution of
correctly classified images to the final loss.
Adversarial training can similarly be understood as a way
of altering the distributions of penalties over the data dur-
ing training. Let py(x) be the probability attributed to the
true class y. For a perturbation δ, a first order approxi-
mation of py(x+ δ) can be written:
py(x+ δ) ≈ py(x) + ∂x py · δ
and for an L2 constraint, the worse case perturbation is
δ = − ∂x py‖∂x py‖2 , yielding:
py(x+ δ) ≈ py(x)−  ‖∂x py‖2 .
Training on the perturbed image x+δ appears equivalent
to training on the image x with a probability attributed to
the correct class that has been decreased by  ‖∂x py‖2.
In practice, we reduce the extent to which this process is
an approximation for deep networks by taking multiple
steps of gradient descent with a small step size (Madry
et al., 2018).
5.2 Output Regularization
The idea of regularizing a neural network by altering
the way penalties are distributed over the data during
training has been introduced multiple times before, in-
dependently. Pereyra et al. (2017) refer to this idea as
“output regularization”. For instance, Szegedy et al.
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(2016) propose to penalize over-confident predictions
with label smoothing, where one-hot labels are replaced
with smooth distributions. Xie et al. (2016) implement a
stochastic version of label smoothing with disturbLabel,
where labels randomly become incorrect with a small
probability. Pereyra et al. (2017) introduce an alterna-
tive to label smoothing in the form of an entropy-based
penalty on high-confidence predictions. The BANG
technique (Rozsa et al., 2016) discussed in Section 2 can
also be interpreted as an output regularizer, as it was ex-
plicitly designed to increase the contribution of correctly
classified images to the loss during training. Na et al.
(2017) and Kannan et al. (2018) propose to add a term to
the loss to encourage natural images and their adversarial
counterparts to have similar logit representations. Kan-
nan et al. (2018) also introduce logit squeezing, in which
the norm of the logits is penalized.
Based on the considerations of the previous section, we
can regard weight decay and adversarial training as two
additional members of this family of output regulariz-
ers. Note that weight decay is particularly closely related
to logit squeezing: the effect of both regularizers is to
shrink the norm of the logits, and incidentally, the Lips-
chitz constant of the network.
6 CIFAR-10 Experiments
We now empirically verify previous claims motivated
by studying linear models, in the context of deep learn-
ing. We compare a 32-layer WideResNet (Zagoruyko
and Komodakis, 2016) with width factor 10, to a simple
4-layer CNN described in Table 1. The CNN architec-
ture has 0.4% as many parameters as the WideResNet,
and we expect its mapping from input to output to be
more linear since it has 8× less depth.
Table 1: Simple fully-convolutional architecture adapted
from the CleverHans library tutorials (Papernot et al.,
2017). Model uses ReLU activations, and does not use
batch normalization, pooling, or biases. We respectively
denote h, w, cin, cout, s as kernel height, width, number
of input and output channels w.r.t. each layer, and stride.
Layer h w cin cout s params
Conv1 8 8 3 32 2 6.1k
Conv2 6 6 32 64 2 73.7k
Conv3 5 5 64 64 1 102.4k
Fc1 1 1 256 10 1 2.6k
Total – – – – – 184.8k
The simple CNN was trained for 250 total epochs with
label smoothing, the Adam optimizer, an initial learning
rate of 1e-3, and batch size of 128. No data augmentation
was used other than adversarial training when indicated,
e.g. by “PGD (7–2–8)” for 7 iterations of PGD with a
step size of 2, bounded by max of 8—all out of 255—
per convention for CIFAR-10. This 7–2–8 combination
was used by Madry et al. (2018) to secure their models
for CIFAR-10, therefore we use this as default.
We delay adversarial training until after the first 50
epochs to let the model partially converge so that it can
generate “good” adversarial examples to train on for the
remaining 200 epochs. This is also sometimes done
for efficiency reasons, e.g. on ImageNet (Kurakin et al.,
2017). We denote as “CNN-L2” and “CNN” models
trained per the above procedure, with and without L2
weight decay with regularization constant λ = 1e-3.
We opt for 32 filters in conv1, as opposed to the Clever-
Hans default of 64, because this was roughly the largest
model which could be regularized s.t. it was unable
to memorize training data examples, while maximizing
clean test accuracy. We verify this by attempting to con-
struct fooling images, and then evaluate our models on
L∞, and two held-out L0 counting “norm” attacks.
6.1 Fooling Images
Fooling images (Nguyen et al., 2015), also known as
“rubbish examples” (Goodfellow et al., 2015), are a
class of adversarial examples that begin with an out-of-
distribution example, typically sampled from a Gaussian
or uniform distribution, then maximizing the probability
of a target class by accumulating several gradient updates
in the input. This procedure has led to observations that
we can easily cause DNNs to predict any chosen target
class with high-confidence, even when the input remains
completely unrecognizable to humans. This method is
also motivated by model-based optimization, where one
wants to generate examples that optimize some criteria,
e.g. objects with a small drag coefficient, given a model
that is only trained to distinguish, or regress over inputs.
When we use 64 filters in conv1 (and 2× this number
in conv2,3), we get significant filter sparsity, as both
PGD and weight decay encourage this, yet the model can
be coerced into reproducing some training data with fine
detail. In addition to being a poor generalization strat-
egy, this is a security vulnerability if the training data
are confidential e.g., users’ faces or banking information,
rather than publicly available images (see Carlini et al.
(2018) for other ways to extract secrets). We limit the
number of filters in conv1 to 32 to encourage models
to learn a low-dimensional manifold capturing the data-
generating distribution, but not the actual data. Although
the model still has roughly 3× more parameters than
CIFAR-10 has examples, it has been shown that we can
10
obtain parameter-independent capacity control with suit-
able norm-constraints for shallow models (Neyshabur
et al., 2015).
Fooling image samples crafted with the model in Table 1
are shown in Figure 8. We sample uniformly from 0.5 +
U(0, 0.1) ∈ R32×32×3 and do 50 iterations of gradient
descent with a step size of 5e-3 on the loss using each
class as the target label for a given trial.
(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Fooling images for each of the CIFAR-10
classes using (a) CNN and (b) CNN-L2. Noise is gradu-
ally transformed to resemble training data, but fine detail
is omitted. Examples in (a) are classified with 32–63%
confidence, and 41–81% for (b). Best viewed in colour.
To make the fooling images test more quantitative, we
adopt the procedure suggested by Goodfellow (2015), of
reporting the rate at which FGSM succeeds in causing
the model to hallucinate a target class. This test is typ-
ically not reported in other works as robustness in this
regime remains elusive, and machine learning models
are thought to have a “thin manifold of accuracy” due
to their linear behaviour which makes them overly con-
fident when extrapolating (Goodfellow, 2015; Goodfel-
low et al., 2015). We consider the attack a success if the
argmax logit matches the target label, or equivalently, if
the target softmax probability exceeds 1/10. This is con-
servative vs. choosing the threshold 0.5 per Goodfellow
(2015). We sweep  over the range 0–255, and plot in
Figure 9 the attack success rate (ASR), with the differ-
ence between the two largest softmax probabilities the
margin (M). For each , ASR is an average over 1000
samples from U(0, 1) ∈ R32×32×3, then taking a step in
the direction that maximizes each of the 10 classes.
ASR peaks at around  = 20 for CNN-L2, and then de-
cays almost exponentially with increasing  as we move
away from the manifold. Meanwhile, the softmax layer
is close to uniform and the prediction margin remains
small but slightly increasing. If we use 0.5 as the requi-
site prediction threshold, then the ASR is 0% for  = 16
where it is nearly maximal in Figure 9 for the argmax
case. WRN here is the “Public” model from the Madry
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Figure 9: Attack success rate (ASR) and prediction mar-
gin (M) for a targeted single-step fooling images attack
on CNN-L2 and the “Public” Madry et al. WRN. Even
though CNN-L2 is much more linear than WRN, it is
better at extrapolating on challenging out-of-distribution
examples and has much smaller margin than WRN.
et al. CIFAR-10 challenge8. The ASR for WRN plateaus
after an initial upward spike, as it is very non-linear,
therefore a linear approximation of the loss gets “stuck”.
Despite this, the WRN is more than twice as confident for
all  than the CNN. It was previously shown that taking
multiple steps results in maximum confidence predictions
for the WRN, despite the resulting examples maintaining
a uniform noise appearance (Galloway et al., 2018).
6.2 L∞ Attacks
In Figure 10 we compare our CNNs to the “Public”
and “Secret” pre-trained models that currently hold the
benchmark for robustness to L∞ attacks in the white-
box and black-box setting respectively. These two mod-
els arise from independent runs of the same procedure,
therefore their curves were almost identical over the full
range of  for gradient sign attacks. We average the two
series and denote “WRN” to reduce clutter. A baseline
“WRN-Nat” trained by Madry et al. without PGD is in-
cluded for context. As in their Figure 2, we sweep over
 for white-box attacks, but continue on to max = 128
until all predictions were reduced to chance.
We do not equate accuracy to robustness for white-box
attacks, since the original adversarial examples problem
also considers the saliency of perturbations. Figure 8 de-
picts how gradient-based perturbations with our models
tend to be highly recognizable and structured for targeted
attacks. We expect the Madry et al. models to generally
have higher accuracy for the L∞ attacks characterized
in Figure 10, since they allocate significant capacity for
8https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_
challenge
11
25 50 75 100
epsilon
0
20
40
60
80
100
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
WRN FGSM
WRN PGD
CNN-L2 FGSM
CNN-L2 PGD
WRN-Nat PGD
Figure 10: White-box L∞ optimized gradient-based at-
tacks. The cyan-fill area is where CNN-L2 achieves
higher accuracy than WRN (the Madry et al. defense),
and the orange area is vice versa. The “PGD” attack is
the (20–2–) variant using the cross entropy loss and ran-
dom start. FGSM is only shown for context to compare
the marginal improvement of the PGD attack.
this express purpose. However, it is interesting to note
that our small models eventually do overtake the them
for  > 40. It is also encouraging that the slopes re-
main similar between “CNN-L2 PGD” and “Madry et
al. PGD”, with the offset staying roughly constant in the
small  regime. Neither model fails as catastrophically
as the undefended WRN-Nat.
We provide curves for FGSM not as a meaningful at-
tack, but to show that there was little marginal benefit of
performing multiple attack iterations for CNN-L2, com-
pared to WRN. This shows that CNN-L2 is more lin-
ear locally near natural data manifold—as well as glob-
ally with fooling images—than the WRN.
6.3 L0 Attacks
The L0 counting “norm” was previously proposed as a
natural metric for measuring a model’s ability to resist
perturbations (Papernot et al., 2016a). We now evaluate
on two held out L0 attacks: random pixel swapping, and
the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Paper-
not et al., 2016b) as additional benchmarks. For both of
these attacks, each RGB colour channel was perturbed
separately.
6.3.1 Pixel Swapping
Randomly swapping pixels can be interpreted as a weak
black-box attack that controls for the perturbations’
saliency. This type of perturbation may be less detectable
than JSMA by some statistical methods, as it does not
affect the data distribution globally, however most de-
tection methods do not work well (Carlini and Wagner,
2017a; Athalye et al., 2018; Smith and Gal, 2018).
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Figure 11: An L0 counting “norm” black-box attack in
which we randomly swap pixels, and R,G,B are consid-
ered separately. The cyan-fill area is where CNN-L2 is
more robust than the Madry et al. defense, and the orange
area is vice versa.
In Figure 11, we plot accuracy for four different models,
with each series averaged over three runs. Despite the at-
tack being random, variance was very low even when not
setting the random seed. CNN-L2 overtakes the WRN
beyond ≈ 11% of features swapped, and WRN-Nat at
≈ 5%. For context, Figure 12 shows sample images with
decreasing signal-to-noise (we did not normalize to an
actual SNR). The noise is fairly easily detected by hu-
man vision when presented next to the original, but the
overall image remains interpretable.
Figure 12: CIFAR-10 samples with ratio of pixels ran-
domly swapped annotated (top) and original images (bot-
tom). At 26% of pixels swapped, CNN-L2 achieves
63.1% accuracy, WRN–31.7%, and WRN-Nat–15.4%.
6.3.2 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
Gradient-based attacks tuned for the L0 metric have also
been proposed, such as JSMA which uses a greedy iter-
ative procedure that constructs a saliency map, and sets
pairs of pixels to the full-scale value until the attack ei-
ther succeeds, or some maximum number of pixels are
modified. This maximum is usually expressed as a ratio
of total pixels, as in Section 6.3.1.
In Table 2 we report JSMA targeted success rates when
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Table 2: JSMA success rate (ASR), avg. rate of perturbed
features overall (Pert. Rte), and when attack was success-
ful (S Pert. Rte.) for a number of source images N. Max-
imum ratio of features that may be perturbed denoted by
γ (as a percentage). For each source image, a targeted at-
tack is performed using all non-true labels as the target.
WRN
N γ ASR Pert. Rte. S Pert. Rte.
10
1% 33% 0.8% 0.19%
2% 58% 1.3% 0.51%
3% 81% 1.5% 0.99%
4% 86% 1.7% 1.14%
5% 89% 1.8% 1.28%
100 1% 28.4% 0.8% 0.14%
CNN-L2
10
1% 20% 0.8% 0.11%
2% 52% 1.4% 0.51%
3% 69% 1.7% 0.88%
4% 81% 1.9% 1.25%
5% 88% 2.1% 1.52%
100 1% 26.9% 0.8% 0.13%
the adversary may perturb between 1–5% of features, de-
noted by γ. CNN-L2 limits the adversary to lower attack
success rates for all γ in this range, even when consid-
ering its lesser clean test accuracy relative to WRN, as
we do not skip examples that are incorrectly classified
originally.
6.4 Discussion
It can be observed in Figure 11 that L2 weight decay had
a beneficial effect in defending against the L0 attack for
all , with the benefits being most pronounced when the
ratio of pixels swapped was less than 0.2, or between 0.4
and 0.9.
We omitted “CNN” in Figure 10 to keep the figure clear,
and offer a comparison between with “CNN-L2” here
instead. For the PGD (20–2–) attack, the curves have
similar slope for  < 16, with that of CNN being trans-
lated downward relative to CNN-L2. The difference was
usually between 3–6% for this region, with the greatest
difference of 6.8% at  = 5. Beyond  = 16, CNN was
better, but accuracy was already quite low at this point
around ≈ 15%. We found that the more a model underfit
w.r.t. clean test accuracy (e.g. by optimizing with SGD
instead of Adam, or binarizing hidden representations)
the more gradual the roll-off when attacking with PGD,
and earlier the cross-over point vs. the WRN.
Visualizing the filters of CNN-L2 in Figure 13 further
speaks to the generality of this model. Given the funda-
mentally limited diversity and finite number of examples
in CIFAR-10, it is desirable to learn a distributed rep-
resentation comprising simple image primitives such as
edge and colour detectors. These types of filters emerge
naturally as a result of training a small architecture for
a long time (e.g. 250 epochs), however models trained
with weight decay (Figure 13(b)) have smoother filters,
with some unnecessary ones becoming exactly zero.
(a) (b)
Figure 13: Visualizing filters from layer conv1 for the
model outlined in Table 1. Filters arising from train-
ing without weight decay in (a) have a highly textured
effect, while unimportant filters go to zero in (b) with
overall L2 weight decay. Both models were trained with
the same random seed, hence why similar filters occur at
the same coordinates in the grid. Best viewed in colour.
The random swap experiment is sufficient to demonstrate
that our models are significantly more robust to at least
one attack defined w.r.t theL0 metric. We believe it is un-
likely that the Madry et al. “Public” or “Secret” models
will perform in a more compelling manner than “CNN-
L2” over a similar range for any L0 attack, but we in-
vite others to attempt to show this by attacking our pre-
trained model. Note that no specific action was taken to
confer performance for L0 attacks during training, other
than attempting to tune a model to generalize well.
Models trained on PGD adversarial examples artificially
increase the margin between class centroids by translat-
ing them with respect to the loss function, as PGD is
an equivalent L∞ analogue to FGSM for deeper mod-
els. This reduces data separability by ≈ ‖w‖1 when the
signed gradient is used, which encourages the model to
fit some dimensions of low-variance in the training data
to fully separate the classes. This results in the highly
textured effect seen in Figure 13(a), supporting previous
observations that CNNs have a tendency to latch on to
surface statistics to fulfill the ERM optimization objec-
tive, resulting in a narrow generalization (Jo and Bengio,
2017).
The tendency of adversarial training to encourage fitting
a specific metric, to a given magnitude, is even more pro-
nounced with the harsh cliff in Madry et al. (their Figures
2 a) and b)) for MNIST. We omit an MNIST compari-
son for brevity, but refer readers to examples of targeted
13
hand-draw attacks in a mobile application9.
7 Conclusion
As we may not anticipate how our systems are likely to
be compromised, a reasonable choice is to generalize to
the best of our ability given finite data. Adversarial train-
ing has a limited “sweet-spot” in which it is effective at
increasing robustness to some attacks, whereas weight
decay reduces all generalization errors and encourages
underfitting in the worst-case. Adversarial training is ef-
fective when the perturbation size is small, but remains
challenging to apply without exposing other vulnerabili-
ties. By significantly reducing the hypothesis space, our
models strike compelling trade-offs when subject to un-
seen attacks. This provides a more complete baseline
for future robustness comparisons which may involve
more sophisticated learning objectives, and regulariza-
tion techniques that do not degenerate with depth. In-
corporating prior expert knowledge and interpretability
measures seem promising for limiting the impact of ad-
versarial examples, given sparsely sampled datasets in
high-dimensions. We suggest future works sweep over
the full perturbation range for several unseen attacks be-
fore drawing robustness conclusions.
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